Quantifying Differential Privacy under Temporal Correlations by Cao, Yang et al.
Quantifying Differential Privacy under Temporal
Correlations
Yang Cao∗†, Masatoshi Yoshikawa∗, Yonghui Xiao†, Li Xiong†
∗Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
Email: {soyo@db.soc., yoshikawa@}i.kyoto–u.ac.jp
†Department of Math and Computer Science, Emory University, Atlanta, USA
Email: {ycao31, yonghui.xiao, lxiong}@emory.edu
Abstract—Differential Privacy (DP) has received increasing
attention as a rigorous privacy framework. Many existing studies
employ traditional DP mechanisms (e.g., the Laplace mechanism)
as primitives, which assume that the data are independent, or
that adversaries do not have knowledge of the data correlations.
However, continuous generated data in the real world tend to be
temporally correlated, and such correlations can be acquired by
adversaries. In this paper, we investigate the potential privacy loss
of a traditional DP mechanism under temporal correlations in the
context of continuous data release. First, we model the temporal
correlations using Markov model and analyze the privacy leakage
of a DP mechanism when adversaries have knowledge of such
temporal correlations. Our analysis reveals that the privacy loss of
a DP mechanism may accumulate and increase over time. We call
it temporal privacy leakage. Second, to measure such privacy loss,
we design an efficient algorithm for calculating it in polynomial
time. Although the temporal privacy leakage may increase over
time, we also show that its supremum may exist in some cases.
Third, to bound the privacy loss, we propose mechanisms that
convert any existing DP mechanism into one against temporal
privacy leakage. Experiments with synthetic data confirm that
our approach is efficient and effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of wearable and mobile devices, vast
amount of temporal data generated by individuals are being
collected, such as trajectories and web page click streams. The
continuous publication of statistics from these temporal data
has the potential for significant social benefits such as disease
surveillance [4], real-time traffic monitoring [18] and web
mining [26]. However, privacy concerns hinder the wider use
of these data. To this end, differential privacy under continual
observation [1] [3] [8] [13] [15] [17] [22] [36] has received
increasing attention because it provides a rigorous privacy
guarantee. Intuitively, differential privacy (DP) [12] ensures
that the modification of any single user’s data in the database
has a “slight” (bounded in ) impact on the change in outputs.
The parameter  is defined to be a positive real number to
control the privacy level. Larger values of  result in larger
privacy leakage.
However, most existing works on differentially private
continuous aggregate release has an implicit assumption of
data independence, i.e., there is no correlation between the
data. Recent studies [23] [24] [25] point out that traditional DP
may not guarantee the expected privacy on correlated data. The
following example shows that the temporal correlations may
degrade the expected privacy guarantee of DP.
t= 1 2 3 …
u1 loc3 loc1 loc1 …
u2 loc2 loc1 loc1 …
u3 loc2 loc4 loc5 …
u4 loc4 loc5 loc3 …
(a) Location Data (b) Road Network
 loc4
 loc5
loc3
(d) Private Counts(c) True Counts
t= 1 2 3 ..
loc1 0 2 2 ..
loc2 2 0 0 ..
loc3 1 0 1 ..
loc4 1 1 0 ..
loc5 0 1 1 ..
t= 1 2 3 ..
loc1 0 1 3 ..
loc2 3 1 0 ..
loc3 1 0 1 ..
loc4 2 1 0 ..
loc5 1 3 3 ..
Laplace
Noise
Fig. 1: Differentially Private Continuous Aggregate Release
under Temporal Correlations.
Example 1. Consider the scenario of continuous aggregate
release illustrated in Figure 1. A trusted server collects users’
locations at each time point in Figure 1(a) and continuously
publishes aggregate (i.e., the counts of people at each location)
in Figure1(c) with differential privacy. Our goal is to achieve
-DP at each time point t (event-level -DP [13] [15]) where
t ∈ [1, T ]. Suppose that each user appears at only one location
at each time point. According to the Laplace mechanism [14],
adding Lap(1/) noise1 to perturb each count in Figure1(c)
can achieve -DP at each time point. However, the expected
privacy guarantee may decay due to temporal correlations as
follows. Using auxiliary information, such as road networks,
an attacker may know users’ mobility patterns, such as “al-
ways arriving at loc5 after visiting loc4” (shown in Figure
1(b)), leading to the patterns illustrated in solid lines of Figure
1(c). The temporal correlation due to this road network can
be represented as Pr(lt = loc5|lt−1 = loc4) = 1 where
lt is the location of a user at time t. That is, given the
previous counts of loc4, an attacker can derive the current
count of loc5. Consequently, because an adversary can perform
inference due to such correlations between the two consecutive
time points (i.e., as if the same count is released two times),
adding Lap(1/) noise to each count guarantees 2-DP at
the time point. Furthermore, let us consider an extreme case
of temporal correlation (e.g., a terrible traffic congestion)
Pr(lt = loc4|lt−1 = loc4) = Pr(lt = loc5|lt−1 = loc5) = 1
1Lap(b) denotes a Laplace distribution with variance 2b2.
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(i.e., the counts of loc4 and loc5 will not change over time).
Then, adding Lap(1/) noise to each count guarantees T-DP
at time point T .
It is reasonable to consider that adversaries may obtain the
temporal correlations, which commonly exist in our real life
and are easily acquired from public information or historical
data. In addition to road networks, there are countless factors
that may cause temporal correlations such as the common
patterns characterizing human activities [19] and weather con-
ditions [20].
Few studies in the literature investigated such potential
privacy loss of event-level -DP under temporal correlations
as shown in Example 1. A direct method (without finely
utilizing the probability of correlation) involves amplifying the
perturbation in terms of group differential privacy [9] [14],
i.e., protecting the correlated data as a group. In Example
1, for temporal correlation Pr(lt = loc5|lt−1 = loc4) = 1,
we can protect the counts of loc4 at time t − 1 and loc5 at
time t in a group (the sensitivity becomes 2) by increasing the
scale of the perturbation to Lap(2/) at each time point; for
temporal correlation Pr(lt = loci|lt−1 = loci) = 1, in order to
guarantee -DP at time T , we need to add Lap(T/) noise at
each time point because the privacy leakage accumulates over
time. However, this technique is not suitable for probabilistic
correlations to finely prevent privacy leakage and may over-
perturb the data as a result. For example, regardless of whether
Pr(lt = loci|lt−1 = loci) is 1 or 0.1, it always protects the
correlated data in a bundle.
Although a few studies investigated the issue of differential
privacy under probabilistic correlations, they are not applicable
for continuous data release because of the different problem
settings. The following two works focused on one-shot data
release and different types of correlations. Yang et al. [37]
proposed Bayesian differential privacy (BDP), which measures
the privacy leakage under probabilistic correlations between
tuples, modeled by a Gaussian Markov Random Field without
taking time factor into account. Liu et al. [29] proposed
dependent differential privacy by introducing two parameters
of dependence size and probabilistic dependence relationship
between tuples. However, it is not clear whether we can specify
them for temporally correlated data. Another line of work
[32] [34] [35] has investigated adversaries with knowledge
of temporal correlations. They focused on designing new
mechanisms for protecting a single user’s location privacy
extending DP, whereas we attempt to quantify the potential
privacy loss of a traditional DP mechanism in the context of
continuous aggregate release.
We call the adversary considered in traditional DP with
additional knowledge of probabilistic temporal correlations
adversaryT . Rigorously quantifying and bounding the privacy
leakage against adversaryT remains a challenge. Therefore, our
goal is to solve the following problems in this paper:
• How do we formalize adversaryT and define the
privacy loss against adversaryT ? (Section III)
• How do we calculate the privacy loss against
adversaryT ? (Section IV)
• How do we bound the privacy loss against
adversaryT ? (Section V)
A. Contributions
In this work, for the first time, we quantify and bound
the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism due to temporal
correlations. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we rigorously define adversaryT with temporal cor-
relations that are described by the commonly used Markov
model. The temporal correlations include backward and for-
ward correlations, i.e., Pr(lt−1i |lti) and Pr(lti |lt−1i ) where lti
denotes the value (e.g., location) of user i at time t. We then
define Temporal Privacy Leakage (TPL) as the privacy loss of
a DP mechanism at time t against adversaryT . TPL includes
two parts: Backward Privacy Leakage (BPL) and Forward
Privacy leakage (FPL) due to the existence of backward and
forward temporal correlations. Our analysis shows that BPL
may accumulates from previous privacy leakage and FPL
increases with future release. Intuitively, BPL at time t is
affected by previously released data and FPL at time t will
be affected by future releases. We define α-differential privacy
under temporal correlation, denoted as α-DPT , to formalize
the privacy guarantee of a DP mechanism against adversaryT ,
i.e., the temporal privacy leakage should be bounded in α.
We prove a new form of sequential composition theorem for
α-DPT (different from the traditional sequential composition
[31] for -DP).
Second, we efficiently calculate the temporal privacy leak-
age under given backward and forward temporal correlations.
We transform the calculation of temporal privacy leakage in
finding an optimal solution of a linear-fractional programming
problem. This type of problem can be solved using a simplex
algorithm in exponential time. By exploiting the constraints,
we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to finely quantify the
temporal privacy leakage.
Third, we design private data release algorithms that can be
used to convert a traditional DP mechanism into one satisfying
α-DPT . A challenge is that the temporal privacy leakage may
increase over time so that α-DPT is hard to achieve when
the length of release time T is unknown. In our first solution,
we prove that the supremum of temporal privacy leakage may
exist in some cases, and in these cases, we allocate appropriate
privacy budgets to make sure the increased temporal privacy
leakage will never be greater than α, no matter how long the
T is. However, when T is too short for the accumulation of
temporal privacy leakage to result in a significant increase, we
may over-perturb the data. The second solution is to exactly
achieve α-DPT at each time point by finely calculating the
temporal privacy leakage.
Finally, experiments with synthetic data confirm the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of our privacy leakage quantification
algorithm. We also demonstrate the impact of different degree
of temporal correlations on privacy leakage.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [12] is a formal definition of data
privacy. Let D be a database and D′ be a copy of D that
is different in any one tuple. D and D′ are neighboring
databases. A differentially private output from D or D′ should
exhibit little difference.
Definition 1 (-DP). M is a randomized mechanism that takes
as input D and outputs r, i.e., M(D) = r. M satisfies -
differential privacy (-DP) if the following inequality is true
for any pair of neighboring databases D,D′ and all possible
outputs r.
log
Pr(r|D)
Pr(r|D′) ≤ . (1)
The parameter , called the privacy budget, represents the
degree of privacy offered. Intuitively, a lower value of  implies
stronger privacy guarantee and a larger perturbation noise, and
a higher value of  implies a weaker privacy guarantee while
possibly achieving higher accuracy.
A commonly used method to achieve -DP is the Laplace
mechanism, which adds random noise drawn from a calibrated
Laplace distribution into the aggregates to be published.
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism). Let Q : D → R be a
statistical query on database D. The sensitivity of Q is defined
as the maximum L1 norm between Q(D) and Q(D′), i.e.,
∆ = maxD,D′ ||Q(D)−Q(D′)||1. We can achieve -DP by adding
Laplace noise with scale ∆/, i.e., Lap(∆/).
B. Privacy Leakage
Let us first discuss the adversaries tolerated by differen-
tial privacy, and then formalize privacy leakage w.r.t. such
adversaries. Differential privacy is able to protect against the
attackers who even have knowledge of all users’ data in
the database except the one of the targeted victim [16]. Let
i ∈ U be a user in the database D. Let Ai be an adversary
who targets user i and has knowledge of DK = D − {li}
where li ∈ [loc1, . . . , locn] denotes the data of user i. The
adversary Ai observes the private output r and attempts to
guess whether the possible value of user i is locj or lock where
locj , lock ∈ [loc1, . . . , locn]. We define the privacy leakage of a
DP mechanism as follows.
Definition 2 (Privacy Leakage of a DP mechanism against
Ai). Let U be a set of users in the database. Let Ai be an
adversary who targets user i and knows all the tuples in the
database except the one of user i. The privacy leakage of a
differentially private mechanism M against one Ai and all
Ai, i ∈ U are defined, respectively, as follows in which li and
l′i are two different possible values of user i’s data.
PL0(Ai,M) def== sup
r,li,l
′
i
log
Pr(r|li, DK)
Pr(r|l′i, DK)
PL0(M) def== max∀Ai,i∈U
PL0(Ai,M) = sup
r,D,D′
log
Pr(r|D)
Pr(r|D′)
In other words, the privacy budget of a DP mechanism
can be considered as a metric of privacy leakage. The larger
, the larger the privacy leakage. Hence, we can say that M
satisfies -DP if PL0(M) ≤ . We note that a ′-DP mechanism
automatically satisfies -DP if ′ < . For convenience, in the
following parts of this paper, when we say that M satisfies
-DP, we mean that the privacy leakage is equal to .
C. Problem Setting
We attempt to quantify the potential privacy loss of a
DP mechanism under temporal correlations in the context of
continuous data release (e.g., releasing private counts at each
time as shown in Figure 1). Users in the database, denoted by
U , are generating data continuously. Let loc = {loc1, . . . , locn}
TABLE I: Summary of Notations.
U The set of users in the database
i The i-th user where i ∈ [1, |U |]
loc Value domain {loc1, . . . , locn} of all user’s data
lti, l
t
i
′ The data of user i at time t, lti ∈ loc, lti 6= lti ′
Dt The database at time t, Dt = {lt1, . . . , ltn}
Mt Differentially private mechanism over Dt
rt Differentially private output at time t
Ai The adversary who targets user i, considered in traditional DP
ATi Adversary Ai with additional knowledge of temporal correlations
PBi Transition matrix that represents Pr(l
t−1
i |lti),
i.e., backward temporal correlation, known to ATi
PFi Transition matrix that represents Pr(l
t
i|lt−1i ),
i.e., forward temporal correlation, known to ATi
DtK The subset of database D
t − {lti}, known to ATi
be all possible values of user’s data. We denote the value of
user i at time t by lti . A trusted server collects the data of
each user into the database Dt = {lt1, . . . , lt|U|} at each time
t (e.g., the columns in Figure 1(a)). A DP mechanism Mt
releases differentially private output rt independently at each
time t. Our goal is to quantify and bound the potential privacy
loss of Mt against adversaries with knowledge of temporal
correlations. We summarize the notations used in this paper in
Table I. We note that while we use location data in Example 1,
the problem setting is general for temporally correlated data.
Our problem setting is identical to differential privacy
under continual observation in the literature [1] [3] [8] [13]
[15] [17] [22] [36]. In contrast to “one-shot” data release
over a static database, the adversaries can observe multiple
differentially private outputs, i.e., r1, . . . , rt. There are typi-
cally two different privacy goals in the context of continuous
data release: event-level and user-level [13] [15]. The former
protects each user’s single data point at time t (i.e., the
neighboring databases are Dt and Dt′), whereas the latter
protects the presence of a user with all her data on the
timeline (i.e., the neighboring databases are {D1, . . . , Dt} and
{D1′, . . . , Dt′}). In this work, we mainly study the privacy
leakage at a single time point (event-level) under temporal
correlations, and we also extend the discussion to user-level
privacy by studying the composability of the privacy leakage.
III. ANALYZING PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In the following, we first formalize adversary with temporal
correlations in Section III-A. We then define and analyze
temporal privacy leakage in Section III-B. We provide a new
privacy notion of α-DPT against temporal privacy leakage and
prove its composability in Section III-C. Finally, we make a
few important observations in Section III-D.
A. Adversay with Knowledge of Temporal Correlations
Markov Chain for Temporal Correlations. The Markov
chain (MC) is extensively used in modeling user mobility
profiles [19] [30] [32]. For a time-homogeneous first-order
MC, a user’s current value only depends on the previous
one. The parameter of the MC is the transition matrix, which
describes the probabilities for transition between values. The
sum of the probabilities in each row of the transition matrix is
1. A concrete example of transition matrix and time-reversed
one for location data is shown in Figure 2. As shown in
Figure 2(a), if user i is at loc1 now (time t); then, the
probability of coming from loc3 (time t − 1) is 0.7, namely,
loc1 loc2 loc3
loc1 0.2 0.3 0.5
loc2 0.1 0.1 0.8
loc3 0.6 0.2 0.2
(b) Transition Matrix 
time  t
tim
e 
 t-
1
Pr(lit lit−1)
Forward Temporal Correlation PiF
loc1 loc2 loc3
loc1 0.1 0.2 0.7
loc2 0 0 1
loc3 0.3 0.3 0.4
(a) Transition Matrix 
time  t-1
tim
e 
 t
Pr(lit−1 lit )
Backward Temporal Correlation PiB
Fig. 2: Examples of Temporal Correlations.
Pr(lt−1i = loc3|lti = loc1) = 0.7. As shown in Figure 2(b),
if user i was at loc3 at the previous time t − 1, then the
probability of being at loc1 now (time t) is 0.6; namely,
Pr(lti = loc1|lt−1i = loc3) = 0.6. We call the transition matrices
in Figure 2(a) and (b) as backward temporal correlation and
forward temporal correlation, respectively.
Definition 3 (Temporal Correlations). The backward and
forward temporal correlations between user i’s data lt−1i
and lti are described by transition matrices P
B
i , P
F
i ∈ Rn×n,
representing Pr(lt−1i |lti) and Pr(lti |lt−1i ), respectively.
It is reasonable to consider that the backward and/or
forward temporal correlations could be acquired by adver-
saries. For example, the adversaries can learn them from
user’s historical trajectories (or the reversed trajectories) by
well studied methods such as Maximum Likelihood estimation
(supervised) or Baum-Welch algorithm (unsupervised). Also, if
the initial distribution of l1i is known (i.e., Pr(l1i )), the backward
temporal correlation (i.e., Pr(lt−1i |lti)) can be derived from the
forward temporal correlation (i.e., Pr(lti |lt−1i )) by the following
Bayesian inference.
Pr(lt−1i |lti) =
Pr(lti |lt−1i ) ∗ Pr(lt−1i )∑
lt−1i
Pr(lti |lt−1i ) ∗ Pr(lt−1i )
Since estimating temporal correlations from data is beyond the
scope of this work, we assume the adversaries’ prior knowl-
edge about temporal correlations is given in our framework.
We now define an “updated version” of Ai (in Definition
2) with knowledge of temporal correlations.
Definition 4 (AdversaryT ). AdversaryT is a class of adver-
saries who have knowledge of (1) all other users’ data DtK
at each time t except the one of the targeted victim, i.e.,
DtK = D
t − {lti}, and (2) backward and/or forward temporal
correlations represented as transition matrices PBi and PFi . We
denote AdversaryT who targets user i by ATi (PBi , PFi ).
There are three types of adversaryT : (i) ATi (PBi , ∅), (ii)
ATi (∅, PFi ), (iii) ATi (PBi , PFi ), where ∅ denotes that the cor-
responding correlations are not known to the adversaries2.
For simplicity, we denote types (i) and (ii) as ATi (PBi ) and
ATi (P
F
i ), respectively. We note that ATi (∅, ∅) is the same as
the traditional DP adversary Ai without any knowledge of
temporal correlations.
We now show what information ATi can derive from the
temporal correlations.
Lemma 1. The adversary ATi who has knowledge of PBi can
derive Pr(Dt−1|Dt) = Pr(lt−1i |lti).
Lemma 2. The adversary ATi who has knowledge of PFi can
derive Pr(Dt|Dt−1) = Pr(lti |lt−1i ).
We omit the proofs of the lemmas due to space limitations.
2The adversaries of types (i) and (ii) will not “guess” the missing correla-
tions; otherwise, they fall under type (iii).
B. Temporal Privacy Leakage
We now define the privacy leakage w.r.t. adversaryT . For
the convenience of analysis, let us assume the length of release
time3 is T . The adversary ATi observes the differentially private
outputs r1, . . . , rt, . . . , rT and attempts to infer the value of
user i’s data at time t, namely lti . Similar to Definition 2, we
define the privacy leakage in terms of event-level differential
privacy in the context of continual data release as described in
Section II-C.
Definition 5 (Temporal Privacy Leakage, TPL). Let Dt′ be a
neighboring database of Dt. Let DtK be the tuple knowledge
of ATi . We have Dt′ = DtK ∪ {lti} and Dt′ = DtK ∪ {lti ′} where
lti and l
t
i
′ are two different values of user i’s data at time t.
Temporal Privacy Leakage (TPL) ofMt w.r.t. a single ATi and
all ATi , i ∈ U are defined, respectively, as follows.
TPL(ATi ,Mt)
def
== sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,r1,...,rT
log
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |lti, DtK)
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |lti ′, DtK)
. (2)
TPL(Mt) def== max
∀AT
i
,i∈U
TPL(A
T
i ,Mt) (3)
= sup
Dt,Dt
′
,r1,...,rT
log
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |Dt)
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |Dt′) . (4)
We first analyze TPL(ATi ,Mt) (i.e., Equation (2)) because
it is key to solve Equation (3) or (4). We can rewrite
TPL(ATi ,Mt) as follows because r1, . . . , rT are published in-
dependently by differentially private mechanismM1, . . . ,MT .
Eqn.(2) = sup
lt,lti
′
,r1,...,rT
log
Pr(r1|lti, DtK)
Pr(r1|lti ′, DtK)
∗ · · · ∗ Pr(r
T |lti, DtK)
Pr(rT |lti ′, DtK)
= sup
r1,...,rt,
lti,l
t
i
′
log
Pr(r1, ..., rt|lti, DtK)
Pr(r1, ..., rt|lti ′, DtK)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
backward privacy leakage
+ sup
rt,...,rT ,
lti,l
t
i
′
log
Pr(rt, ..., rT |lti, DtK)
Pr(rt, ..., rT |lti ′, DtK)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
forward privacy leakage
− sup
rt,lt
i
,lt
i
′
log
Pr(rt|lti, DtK)
Pr(rt|lti ′, DtK)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PL0(A
T
i
,Mt)
(5)
It is clear that PL0(ATi ,Mt) = PL0(Ai,Mt) because PL0
indicates the privacy leakage w.r.t. one output r (refer to
Definition 2). As annotated in the above equation, we define
backward and forward privacy leakage as follows.
Definition 6 (Backward Privacy Leakage, BPL). The privacy
leakage of Mt caused by r1, ..., rt w.r.t. ATi is called backward
privacy leakage, defined as follows.
BPL(ATi ,Mt) def== sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,r1,...,rt
log
Pr(r1, . . . , rt|lti , DtK)
Pr(r1, . . . , rt|lti ′, DtK)
. (6)
BPL(Mt) def== max
∀ATi ,i∈U
BPL(ATi ,Mt). (7)
Definition 7 (Forward Privacy Leakage, FPL). The privacy
leakage of Mt caused by rt, ..., rT w.r.t. ATi is called forward
privacy leakage, defined by follows.
FPL(ATi ,Mt) def== sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,rt,...,rT
log
Pr(rt, . . . , rT |lti , DtK)
Pr(rt, . . . , rT |lti ′, DtK)
. (8)
FPL(Mt) def== max
∀ATi ,i∈U
FPL(ATi ,Mt). (9)
By substituting Equation (6) and (8) into (5), we have
TPL(ATi ,Mt) = BPL(ATi ,Mt) + FPL(ATi ,Mt)− PL0(ATi ,Mt). (10)
3In this paper, we do not need to know the length of release time in advance.
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Fig. 3: Example of Temporal Privacy Leakage of Lap(1/0.1) at each time point.
Similarly, by expanding Equation (4) to one resembling Equa-
tion (5) and combining it with Equation (7) and (9), we have
TPL(Mt) = BPL(Mt) + FPL(Mt)− PL0(Mt). (11)
Intuitively, BPL and FPL are the privacy leakage w.r.t. the
adversaries ATi (PBi ) and ATi (PFi ) , respectively. TPL is the
privacy leakage w.r.t. ATi (PBi , PFi ). In Equation (11), we need
to minus PL0(Mt) because it is counted in both BPL and FPL.
We will show more details in the following analysis.
BPL over time. For BPL, we first expand and sim-
plify Equation (6) by Bayesian theorem and Lemma 1,
BPL(ATi ,Mt) is equal to
sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,
r1,...,rt−1
log
∑
l
t−1
i
Pr(r1, . . . , rt−1|lt−1i , Dt−1K ) Pr(lt−1i |lti)∑
l
t−1′
i
Pr(r
1
, . . . , r
t−1|lt−1i
′
, D
t−1
K )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) BPL(AT
i
,Mt−1)
Pr(l
t−1′
i |lti
′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) PB
i
+ sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,rt
log
Pr(rt|lti, DtK)
Pr(r
t|lti
′
, D
t
K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii) PL0(A
T
i
,Mt)
. (12)
We now discuss the three annotated terms in the above
equation. The first term indicates BPL at the previous time
t − 1, the second term is the backward temporal correlation
determined by PBi , and the third term is equal to the privacy
leakage w.r.t. adversaries in traditional DP (see Definition 2).
Hence, BPL at time t depends on (i) BPL at time t − 1, (ii)
the backward temporal correlations, and (iii) the (traditional)
privacy leakage of Mt (which is related to the privacy budget
allocated to Mt). By Equation (12), we know that if t = 1,
BPL(ATi ,M1) = PL0(Ai,M1); if t > 1, we have the following,
where LB(·) is a backward temporal privacy loss function for
calculating the accumulated privacy loss.
BPL(ATi ,Mt) = LB
(
BPL(ATi ,Mt−1)
)
+ PL0(Ai,Mt) (13)
Equation (13) reveals that the BPL is calculated recursively and
may accumulate over time, as shown in Example 2 (Fig.3(a)).
Example 2 (BPL due to previous releases). Suppose that
a DP mechanism Mt satisfies PL0(Mt) = 0.1 for each time
t ∈ [1, T ], i.e., 0.1-DP at each time point. We now discuss
BPL at each time point w.r.t. ATi with knowledge of backward
temporal correlations PBi . In an extreme case, if PBi indicates
the strongest correlation, say, PBi =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, then, at time t,
ATi knows lti = l
t−1
i = · · · = l1i , i.e., Dt = Dt−1 = · · · = D1
because of Dt = {lti} ∪ DtK for any t ∈ [1, T ]. Hence, the
continuous data release r1, . . . , rt is equivalent to releasing the
same database multiple times; the privacy leakage at each time
point will accumulate from previous time points and increase
linearly (Figure 3(a)(i)). In another extreme case, if there is
no backward temporal correlation that is known to ATi (e.g.,
for the Ai in Definition 2 or ATi (PFi )
4), the backward privacy
leakage at each time point is PL0(Mt), as shown in Figure
3(a)(iii). Figure 3(a)(ii) depicts the backward privacy leakage
caused by PBi =
(
0.8 0.2
0 1
)
, which can be finely quantified using
our method (Algorithm 1) in Section IV.
FPL over time. For FPL, similar to the analysis of BPL,
we expand and simplify Equation (6) by Bayesian theorem and
Lemma 2, FPL(ATi ,Mt) is equal to
sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,
rt+1,...,rT
log
∑
l
t+1
i
Pr(rt+1, . . . , rT |lt+1i , Dt+1K ) Pr(lt+1i |lti)∑
l
t+1′
i
Pr(r
t+1
, . . . , r
T |lt+1i
′
, D
t+1
K )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) FPL(AT
i
,Mt+1)
Pr(l
t+1′
i |lti
′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) PF
i
+ sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,rt
log
Pr(rt|lti, DtK)
Pr(r
t|lti
′
, D
t
K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii) PL0(A
T
i
,Mt)
. (14)
By Equation (14), we know that if t = T , FPL(ATi ,MT ) =
PL0(Ai,MT ); if t < T , we have the following, where LF (·) is
a forward temporal privacy loss function for calculating the
increased privacy loss due to FPL at the next time.
FPL(ATi ,Mt) = LF
(
FPL(ATi ,Mt+1)
)
+ PL0(Ai,Mt) (15)
Equation (15) reveals that FPL is calculated recursively and
may increase over time, as shown in Example 3 (Fig.3(b)).
Example 3 (FPL due to future releases). Considering the
same setting in Example 2, we now discuss FPL at each
time point w.r.t. ATi with knowledge of forward temporal
correlations PFi . In an extreme case, if PFi indicates the
strongest correlation, say, PFi =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, then, at time t, ATi
knows lti = l
t+1
i = · · · = lTi , i.e., Dt = Dt+1 = · · · = DT because
of Dt = {lti}∪DtK for any t ∈ [1, T ]. Hence, the continuous data
release rt, . . . , rT is equivalent to releasing the same database
multiple times; the privacy leakage at time t will increase
when every time new release (i.e., rt+1,rt+2,...) happens. For
example, we see that contrary to BPL, the FPL at time 1 is
the highest (due to future releases at time 1 to 10) while FPL
at time 10 is the lowest (since there is no future release with
respect to time 10 yet). When r11 is released, all FPL at time
t ∈ [1, 10] will be updated. In another extreme case, if there is
no forward temporal correlation that is known to ATi (e.g., for
the Ai in Definition 2 or ATi (PBi )), then the forward privacy
leakage at each time point is PL0(Mt), as shown in Figure
3(b)(iii). Figure 3(b)(ii) depicts the forward privacy leakage
caused by PFi =
(
0.8 0.2
0 1
)
, which can be finely quantified using
our method (Algorithm 1) in Section IV.
4In this case, given the current lti and P
F
i , i.e., Pr(l
t
i |lt−1i ), the adversary
cannot derive lti = l
t−1
i = · · · = l1i .
Remark 1. The extreme cases shown in Example 2 and 3
are the upper and lower bound of BPL and FPL. Hence, the
backward temporal privacy loss function LB(·) in Equation
(13) and the forward temporal privacy loss function LF (·) in
Equation (15) satisfy 0 ∗ · ≤ LB(·) ≤ 1 ∗ ·, where · is BPL at
the previous time, and 0 ∗ · ≤ LF (·) ≤ 1 ∗ ·, where · is FPL at
the next time, respectively.
From Example 2 and 3, we know that: backward temporal
correlation (i.e.,PBi ) does not affect FPL, and forward temporal
correlation (i.e.,PFi ) does not affect BPL. In other words,
adversary ATi (PBi ) only causes BPL; ATi (PFi ) only causes FPL;
while ATi (PBi , PFi ) poses a risk on both BPL and FPL.
Figure 3(c) shows TPL, which is calculated using BPL and
FPL (see Equation (11)). Given PBi and PFi , finely quantifying
TPL is a challenge. We will design a novel algorithm to
calculate them efficiently in Section IV.
C. DP under Temporal Correlations and Its Composability
In this section, we define α-DPT to provide a privacy
guarantee against temporal privacy leakage. We prove its
sequential composition theorem and discuss the connection
between α-DPT and -DP in terms of event-level/user-level
privacy [13] [15] and w-event privacy [22].
Definition 8 (α-DPT ). For all user i in the database, if TPL
ofMt (see Definition 5) is less than or equal to α, we say that
Mt satisfies α-differential privacy under temporal correlation,
denoted by α-DPT .
DPT is an enhanced version of DP on temporal data. If the
data are temporally independent (i.e., for all user i, both PBi
and PFi are ∅), an -DP mechanism satisfies -DPT . If the
data are temporally correlated (i.e., existing user i whose PBi
or PFi is not ∅), an -DP mechanism satisfies α-DPT where
α is the increased privacy leakage and can be quantified using
our framework.
One may wonder, for a sequence of DPT mechanisms on
the timeline, what is the overall privacy guarantee. Suppose
that Mt satisfies t-DP and poses risks of BPL and FPL as αBt
and αFt , respectively. That is, Mt satisfies (αBt +αFt − t)-DPT
at time t according to Equation (11). We formally define such
overall privacy leakage based on Equation (4).
Definition 9 (TPL of a sequence of DP mechanisms). The
temporal privacy leakage of DP mechanisms {Mt, . . . ,Mt+j}
where j ≥ 0 is defined as follows.
TPL
({Mt, . . . ,Mt+j}) def== sup
Dt,...,Dt+j ,
Dt
′
,...,Dt+j
′
,
r1,...,rT
log
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |Dt, . . . , Dt+j)
Pr(r1, . . . , rT |Dt′, . . . , Dt+j ′)
It is easy to see that, if j = 0, it is event-level privacy; if
t = 1 and j = |T − 1|, it is user-level privacy.
Theorem 2 (Composition under Temporal Correlations). A
sequence of DP mechanism {Mt, . . . ,Mt+j} satisfies{
(αBt + α
F
t+1)-DPT j = 1(
αBt + α
F
t+j +
∑k=j−1
k=1 t+k
)
-DPT j ≥ 2
(16)
We omit the proofs of Theorems 2 due to space limitations.
When t = 1 and j = T − 1 in Theorem 2, we have the
following corollary because αB1 = BPL(M1) = PL0(M1) and
αFT = FPL(MT ) = PL0(MT ).
Corollary 1. The temporal privacy leakage of a combined
mechanism {M1, . . . ,MT } is ∑k=Tk=1 k.
It shows that temporal correlations do not affect the user-
level privacy (i.e., protecting all the data on the timeline of
each user), which is in line with the idea of group differential
privacy: protecting all the correlated data in a bundle.
We now compare the privacy guarantee between DP and
DPT . As we mentioned in Section II-C, there are typically
two privacy notions in continuous data release: event-level and
user-level [13] [15]. Recently, w-event privacy [22] is proposed
to merge the gap between event-level and user-level privacy. It
protects the data in any w-length sliding window by utilizing
the following sequential composition theorem of DP.
Theorem 3 (Sequential composition on independent data [31]).
Suppose that Mt satisfies t-DP for each t ∈ [1, T ]. A combined
mechanism {Mt, . . . ,Mt+j} satisfies ∑k=jk=1 t+k-DP.
Suppose that Mt satisfies -DP for each t ∈ [1, T ].
According to Theorem 3, it achieves T-DP on user-level and
w-DP on w-event level. We compare the privacy guarantee
on independent data and temporally correlated data as follows.
TABLE II: The privacy guarantee of -DP mechanisms.
Privacy Notion
Data
independent temporally correlated
event-level [13] [15] -DP α-DPT (α ≥ )
w-event [22] w-DP see Theorem 2
user-level [13] [15] T-DP T-DPT (by Corollary 1)
It reveals that temporal correlations may blur the bound-
ary between event-level privacy and user-level privacy. In
an extreme case, the temporal privacy leakage of an -DP
mechanism on event-level can be T, i.e., T-DPT . Consider
the examples shown in Figure 3. Under the strongest tem-
poral correlations, M10 satisfies 1-DPT on event-level and
a combined mechanism {M1, . . . ,M10} also satisfies 1-DPT
on user-level. Essentially, it is because the adversaries may
infer {D1, . . . , DT } (user-level) from Dt (event-level) using
temporal correlations.
D. Discussion
We make a few important observations regarding our
privacy analysis.
First, the temporal privacy leakage is defined in a personal-
ized way. That is, the privacy leakage may be different for users
with distinct temporal patterns (i.e., PBi and PFi ). We define
the overall temporal privacy leakage as the maximum one for
all users, so that α-DPT is compatible with the traditional -
DP mechanism (using one parameter to represent the overall
privacy level) and we can convert a traditional DP mechanism
to bound the temporal privacy leakage. On the other hand, our
definitions also can be compatible with personalized differen-
tial privacy (PDP) mechanisms [21], in which the personalized
privacy budgets, i.e., a vector [1, . . . , n], are allocated to each
user. In other words, we can convert a PDP mechanism to
bound the temporal privacy leakage for each user.
Second, in this paper, we focus on the temporally correlated
data and assume that the adversary has knowledge of temporal
correlations modeled by Markov chain. However, it is possible
that the adversary has knowledge about more sophisticated
temporal correlation model or other types of correlations,
such as user-user correlations modeled by Gaussian Markov
Random Field in [37]. Our contributions in this work can
serve as primitives for quantifying the privacy risk under more
advanced adversarial knowledge.
IV. CALCULATING TEMPORAL PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In this section, we design algorithms for computing back-
ward privacy leakage (BPL) and forward privacy leakage
(FPL). We first show that both of them can be transformed
to the optimal solution of a linear-fractional programming
problem [2]. Traditionally, this type of problem can be solved
by simplex algorithm [10] in exponential time. By exploiting
the constraints in this problem, we then design a method to
solve it in polynomial time.
A. Problem formulation
According to the privacy analysis of BPL and FPL in
Section III-B, we need to solve the backward and forward
temporal privacy loss functions LB(·) and LF (·) in Equations
(13) and (15), respectively. By observing the structure of
the first term in Equations (12) and (14), we can see that
the calculations for recursive functions LB(·) and LF (·) are
virtually in the same way. They calculate the increment of
the input values (the previous BPL or the next FPL) based
on temporal correlations (backward or forward). Although
different degree of correlations result in different privacy loss
functions, the methods for analyzing them are the same.
We now quantitatively analyze the temporal privacy leak-
age. In the following, we demonstrate the calculation of LB(·).
The first term of Equation (12), i.e., LB(BPL(ATi ,Mt−1)) is as
follows.
sup
lti,l
t
i
′
,
r1,...,rt−1
log
∑
l
t−1
i
Pr(r1, . . . , rt−1|lt−1i , Dt−1K ) Pr(lt−1i |lti)∑
l
t−1′
i
Pr(r
1
, . . . , r
t−1|lt−1i
′
, D
t−1
K )︸ ︷︷ ︸
BPL(AT
i
,Mt−1)
Pr(l
t−1′
i |lti
′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PB
i
(17)
We now simplify the notations in the above formula.
Let two arbitrary (different) rows in PBi be vectors q =
(q1, ..., qn) and d = (d1, ..., dn). For example, suppose that
q is the first row in the transition matrix of Figure 2(b).
Then, the elements in q are: q1 = Pr(lt−1i = loc1|lti = loc1),
q2 = Pr(l
t−1
i = loc2|lti = loc1), q3 = Pr(lt−1i = loc3|lti = loc1),
etc. Let x = (x1, ..., xn)T be a vector whose elements indicate
Pr(r1, ..., rt−1|lt−1i , Dt−1K ) with distinct values of lt−1i ∈ loc,
e.g., x1 denotes Pr(r1, ..., rt−1|lt−1i = loc1, Dt−1K ). We obtain the
following by expanding lt−1i , l
t−1′
i ∈ loc in (17).
LB(BPL(ATi ,Mt−1)) = sup
q,d∈PBi
log
q1x1 + · · ·+ qnxn
d1x1 + · · ·+ dnxn
= sup
q,d∈PBi
log
qx
dx
Next, we formalize the problem and constraints. Suppose
that BPL(ATi ,Mt−1) = αBt−1. According to the definition of
BPL (as the supremum), for any xj , xk ∈ x, we have e−α
B
t−1 ≤
xj
xk
≤ eαBt−1 . Given x as the variable vector and q,d as the
coefficient vectors, LB(αBt−1) is equal to the logarithm of the
objective function (18) in the following problem (18)∼(20).
maximize
qx
dx
(18)
subject to e−α
B
t−1 ≤ xj
xk
≤ eαBt−1 , (19)
0 < xj < 1 and 0 < xk < 1, (20)
where xj , xk ∈ x, j, k ∈ [1, n].
The above is a form of linear-fractional programming [2],
where the objective function is a ratio of two linear functions
and the constraints are linear inequalities or equations. A
linear-fractional programming problem can be converted into a
sequence of linear programming problems [2] and then solved
using the simplex algorithm [10] in time O(2n). When n is
large, the computation is time consuming.
Bounding the objective function by constraints. We now
investigate a more efficient method to solve this problem by
exploiting the structure of constraints. From Inequalities (19)
and (20), we know that the feasible region of the constraints
are not empty and bounded; hence, an optimal solution exists.
By exploiting the constraints, we prove the following theorem,
which enables the optimal solution to be found in time O(n2).
We define some notations that will be frequently used in
the following parts of this paper. Suppose that the variable
vector x consists of two parts (subsets): x+ and x−. Let the
corresponding coefficients vectors be q+,d+ and q−,d−. Let
q =
∑
q+ and d =
∑
d+. For example, suppose that x+ =
[x1, x3] and x− = [x2, x4, x5]. Then, we have q+ = [q1, q3],
d+ = [d1, d3], q− = [q2, q4, q5], and d− = [d2, d4, q5]. In this
case, q = q1 + q3 and d = d1 + d3.
Theorem 4. If the following Inequalities (21) and (22) are
satisfied, the maximum value of the objective function in the
problem (18)∼(20) is q(eα
B
t−1−1)+1
d(e
αB
t−1−1)+1
.
qj
dj
>
q(e
αBt−1 − 1) + 1
d(e
αB
t−1 − 1) + 1
, ∀j ∈ [1, n] where qj ∈ q+, dj ∈ d+ (21)
qk
dk
≤ q(e
αBt−1 − 1) + 1
d(e
αB
t−1 − 1) + 1
, ∀k ∈ [1, n] where qk ∈ q−, dk ∈ d− (22)
Proof: See Appendix A.
As we mentioned previously, the calculations of LB(·) and
LF (·) are identical. Therefore, given a transition matrix PBi (or
PFi ) and the previous BPL (or the next FPL), the increment of
the backward (or forward) privacy loss is the maximum value
in the above theorem for any two rows q and d in PBi (or
PFi ). We denote BPL(A
T
i ,Mt−1) and FPL(ATi ,Mt+1) by αBt−1
and αFt+1, respectively.
LB(αBt−1) = max
q,d∈PB
i
log
q(e
αBt−1 − 1) + 1
d(e
αB
t−1 − 1) + 1
(23)
LF (αFt+1) = max
q,d∈PF
i
log
q(e
αFt+1 − 1) + 1
d(e
αF
t+1 − 1) + 1
(24)
It is easy to see that we can always find such q+ and
d+ satisfying Inequalities (21) and (22). Further, we give the
following corollary for finding q+ and d+.
Corollary 2. If Inequalities (21) and (22) are satisfied, we
have qj > dj in which qj ∈ q+ and dj ∈ d+.
Now, we simply examine the LB(·) and LF (·) in Equations
(23) and (24). First, we have 0 ≤ LB(αBt−1) and 0 ≤ LF (αBt−1)
because of q > d. Second, when q and d have the largest
difference (e.g., q = (1, 0),d = (0, 1) and hence q = 1, d =
0), it follows that LB(αBt−1) ≤ αBt−1 and LF (αFt+1) ≤ αFt+1.
Therefore, it is in accordance with Remark 1. The advantage
of Equations (23) and (24) is being able to finely quantify BPL
and FPL w.r.t. arbitrary PBi and P
F
i .
B. Privacy Leakage Quantification Algorithm
The next question is how do we find q and d (or q+ and d+)
that give the maximum objective function. Inequalities (21)
and (22) in Theorem 4 are sufficient conditions for obtaining
such optimal value. Corollary 2 gives a necessary condition
for satisfying Inequalities (21) and (22). Based on the above
analysis, we design Algorithm 1 for computing BPL or FPL .
Algorithm 1: Finding BPL or FPL
Input: Pi (PBi or PFi ); α (αBt−1 or αFt+1); t (i.e., PL0(Mt)).
Output: BPL at time t or FPL at time t
1 Li ←− 0 //the value of Equation (23) or (24)
2 foreach two rows q, d ∈ Pi do
3 foreach qj ∈ q, dj ∈ d do //Corollary 2
4 if qj > dj then add qj to q+; add dj to d+
5 update←− false;
6 do //find q+, d+ by Theorem 4
7 q ←−∑ q+; d←−∑d+ //update q and d
8 foreach qj ∈ q+, dj ∈ d+ do
//if it does not satisfy Inequality (21)
9 if qj/dj ≤
(
q ∗ (eα − 1) + 1)/(d ∗ (eα − 1) + 1)
10 then q+ ← q+ − qj ; d+ ← d+ − dj ; update ← true;
11 while update
12 if Li < log q∗(e
α−1)+1
d∗(eα−1)+1 then Li ←− log q∗(e
α−1)+1
d∗(eα−1)+1
13 return Li + t //by Equation (13) or (15)
Computing BPL or FPL by solving the linear-fractional
programming. According to the definition of BPL and FPL,
we need to return the maximum privacy leakage (Line 12)
w.r.t. any two rows in the given transition matrix (Line 2).
Lines 3∼11 are to solve one linear-fractional programming
problem (18)∼(20) w.r.t two specific rows in the transition
matrix. In Lines 3 and 4, we divide the variable vector x into
two parts according to Corollary 2, which gives the necessary
condition for finding the maximum solution: if the coefficients
qj ≤ dj , they are not in q+ and d+ that satisfy Inequalities
(21) and (22). In other words, if qj > dj , they are “candidates”
in q+ and d+ that gives the maximum objective function. In
Lines 5∼11, we further check q+ and d+ whether they satisfy
Inequalities (21) and (22). According to Line 7, it is clear that
any subset of q+ and d+ automatically satisfy Inequality (22).
In Lines 8∼10, we remove the pairs qj ∈ q+ and dj ∈ d+ that
do not satisfy Inequality (21). Note that the values of q and d
(recall that q = ∑ q+ and d = ∑d+) will be recalculated due
to such “update” (deletion in Line 10). If q and d are updated,
we need to recheck each pair of qj and dj in the current set of
q+ and d+ until every pair of them satisfies Inequality (21).
A subtle question may arise regarding such “update”. In
Lines 8∼10, if several pairs of qj and dj do not satisfy
Inequality (21), say, {q1, d1} and {q2, d2}, one may wonder if
it is possible that, after removing {q1, d1} from q+ and d+,
Inequality (21) can be satisfied for {q2, d2} due to the update
of q and d, i.e., q2
d2
>
(q−q1)∗(eα−1)+1
(d−d1)∗(eα−1)+1 . We show that this
is not possible. If q1
d1
≤ q∗(eα−1)+1
d∗(eα−1)+1 , we have
q∗(eα−1)+1
d∗(eα−1)+1 ≤
(q−q1)∗(eα−1)+1
(d−d1)∗(eα−1)+1 . Hence,
q2
d2
≤ q∗(eα−1)+1
d∗(eα−1)+1 ≤
(q−q1)∗(eα−1)+1
(d−d1)∗(eα−1)+1 .
Therefore, we can remove multiple pairs of qj and dj that
do not satisfy Inequality (21) at one time (Lines 8∼10).
It is easy to know that, if qi = di for each i ∈ [1, n], the
update will be terminated with empty q+ and d+. In this case,
we have q = d; hence LB(·) and LF (·) are 0.
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Fig. 4: Examples of the maximum BPL over time.
Algorithm complexity. The time complexity for solving
one linear-fractional programming problem (Lines 3∼11) w.r.t.
two specific rows of the transition matrix is O(n2) because Line
9 may iterate n ∗ (n− 1) times in the worst case. The overall
time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n4).
V. BOUNDING TEMPORAL PRIVACY LEAKAGE
In this section, we design private data release algorithms
that can be used to convert a traditional DP mechanism into
one satisfying α-DPT by allocating calibrated privacy budgets.
We first investigate the upper bound of BPL and FPL. We
have demonstrated that BPL and FPL may accumulate and
increase over time in Figure 3. A natural question is that: is
there a limit of BPL and FPL over time. For Mt that satisfies
-DP at each t ∈ [1, T ], we know that a loose upper bound of
BPL or FPL over time T is T according to Remark 1. When
T is unknown, giving the upper bound of BPL or FPL is a
challenge.
Theorem 5. Given a transition matrix PBi (or PFi ) represent-
ing temporal correlation, let q and d be the ones that give the
maximum value in Equation (23) (or Equation (24)) and q 6= d.
For Mt that satisfies -DP at each t ∈ [1, T ], there are four
cases regarding the supremum of BPL (or FPL) over time.
log
√
4de(1−q)+(d+qe−1)2+d+qe−1
2d
d 6= 0
log
(1−q)e
1−qe d = 0 and q 6= 1 and  ≤ log(1/q)
not exist d = 0 and q 6= 1 and  > log(1/q)
not exist d = 0 and q = 1
We omit the proof due to space limitations.
The above theorem is applicable for both BPL and FPL
because the calculation of BPL and FPL is the same. Accord-
ing to the previous analysis, we can consider that the growth
of BPL and FPL is in the same manner but in the reversed
directions on the timeline (see Figure 3(a)(b)).
Example 4 (The supremum of the increased BPL over time).
Suppose that Mt satisfies -DP at each time point. In Figure
4, we demonstrate the maximum BPL w.r.t. different  and
different transition matrices that represent PBi . In (a) and (b),
the supremum does not exist. In (c) and (d), we can directly
calculate the supremum using Theorem 5. The results are in
line with the ones from computing BPL step by step at each
time point using Algorithm 1.
Achieving α-DPT by limiting upper bound. We now
design a data release algorithm utilizing Theorem 5 to bound
TPL. Theorem 5 tells us that, if it is not the strongest temporal
correlation (i.e., d = 0 and q = 1), we may bound BPL or FPL
within a desired value by allocating an appropriate privacy
budget to a traditional DP mechanism at each time point. A
problem is that, in Theorem 5, the q and d are assumed to be
the ones that give the maximum value of the objective function;
however, they are initially unknown. According to our analysis
of Algorithm 1, such q and d depend on not only the given
transition matrix but also the previous BPL (or the next FPL);
however, the “previous BPL” is not clear when BPL achieves
its supremum at some time point. To solve this problem, we
can consider that, if T is approaching infinite, BPL at time T
and T +1 are both supremum, so that we can find q and d that
give the maximum objective function using Algorithm 1 by
setting the “previous BPL” to such supremum. Now, we can
find an appropriate  to bound BPL based on Theorem 5. For
example, if d = 0 and q 6= 1, we can solve an equation with
one variable : log (1−q)e

1−qe = α
B (we can prove that a positive
solution always exists) where αB is a desirable privacy level.
Similarly, we can restrict FPL within a given value. We use
this idea to bound both BPL and FPL, as shown in Algorithm
2.
Algorithm 2: Releasing Data with α-DPT by upper bound
Input: PBi and P
F
i , i ∈ U ; α (desired privacy level).
Output: private data satisfying α-DPT
1 foreach user i ∈ U do
2 Initialize αB ∈ (0, α] as the supremum of BPL;
3 Find qB and dB that give the maximum value in Eq.(23) using
Algorithm 1 with input αBt−1 = αB ;
4 Find Bi using Theorem 5 with the above q
B , dB and αB ;
5 αF ← α− αB + Bi ; //see Equation (10)
6 Find qF and dF using Algorithm 1 with input αFt+1 = α
F
7 Find Fi using Theorem 5 with the above q
F , dF and αF ;
8 if Bi < Fi then goto Line 2, initialize a larger α
B ;
9 else if Bi > Fi then goto Line 2, initialize a smaller α
B ;
10 else i ← Bi
11 ← min{i, i ∈ U};
12 return -DP data at each time point
Achieving α-DPT by privacy leakage quantification. We
now design Algorithm 3 to overcome a drawback of Algorithm
2: when T is too short for the accumulation of temporal
privacy leakage to result in a significant increase, we may not
take full advantage of the privacy budgets. Our observation
is that, the DP mechanisms at the first and last time points
should be allocated more budgets because they are relatively
more “influential” in term of privacy loss. For example, BPL
of Mt, t ∈ [2, T ] is affected by the first mechanism M1, and
FPL of Mt, t ∈ [1, T − 1] is affected by the last mechanism
MT . Our idea is to allocate more privacy budgets to M1
and MT so that both BPL and FPL are bounded in given
values at each time point. For example, if we want that BPL
at every time points are exactly the same value αB , i.e.,
BPL(M1) = · · · = BPL(MT ) = αB , then we need to make sure:
(i) PL0(M1) = αB and (ii) LB
(
αB
)
+Bm = α
B in which Bm is the
privacy budget allocated in the “middle” of the timeline, i.e.,
from 2 to T−1. We can solve the above equations to obtain Bm
ensuring BPL(M1) = · · · = BPL(MT ) = αB . Similarly, we can
bound FPL in a given αF by finding another Fm. If Bm 6= Fm,
we can assign m as min{Bm, Fm} to ensure both BPL and FPL
are bounded in min{αB , αF }. It is easy to know that, when
Bm = 
F
m, we can exactly achieve α-DPT at each time point.
Algorithm 3: Releasing Data with α-DPT by quantification
Input: PBi and P
F
i , i ∈ U ; α (desired privacy level).
Output: private data satisfying α-DPT
1 foreach user i ∈ U do
2 Initialize αB ∈ (0, α] as the supremum of BPL, i,1 = αB ;
3 Find qB and dB using Algorithm 1 with input αBt−1 = i,1
4 Find Bi,m by solving L
B(i,1) + Bi,m = i,1 with qB , dB ;
5 i,T ← α− Bi,1 + Bi,m; //see Equation (10)
6 Find qF and dF using Algorithm 1 with input αFt+1 = i,T
7 Find Fi,m by solving LF
(
i,T
)
+ Fi,m = i,T with q
F , dF ;
8 if Bi,m < Fi,m then goto Line 2, initialize a larger α
B ;
9 else if Bi,m > Fi,m then goto Line 2, initialize a smaller α
B ;
10 else i,m ← Bi,m
11 1 ← min{i,1, i ∈ U}, t ← min{i,m, i ∈ U}, T ← min{i,T , i ∈ U};
12 return t-DP data at t ∈ [1, T ]
We note that, the initializations of αB in both Algorithm
2 and 3 are nontrivial: too large or too small αB results in
more iterations to converge to Bi,m = Fi,m. We can prove that
Bi,m = 
F
i,m always can be achieved. We delegate the detailed
descriptions and proofs to the long version of our paper.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we design experiments for the following:
(1) verifying the runtime and correctness of our privacy leak-
age quantification algorithm (Algorithm 1), (2) investigating
the impact of the temporal correlations on privacy leakage
and (3) evaluating the data release Algorithms 2 and 3. We
implemented all the algorithms in Java and conducted the
experiments on a machine with an Intel Core i7 2.8GHz CPU
and 16 GB RAM running OSX El Capitan.
The setting of temporal correlations. To evaluate if
our privacy loss quantification algorithms can perform well
under diverse circumstances, we need different degrees of
temporal correlations. Although there are well studied methods
to estimate the temporal correlations, in our experiments, we
generate the correlations (transition matrices) directly to elim-
inate the effect of different estimation algorithms or datasets.
We now present a method for obtaining different degrees
of temporal correlations. First, we generate a transition matrix
indicating the “strongest” correlation that contains a cell with
probability 1.0 at each row but for different columns (this type
of transition matrix will lead to an upper bound of TPL, as
shown in Examples 2 and 3). Then, we perform Laplacian
smoothing [33], which is a method originally used to smooth
a polygonal mesh, to uniformize the probabilities of Pi in
different degree. Let pjk be an element at the jth row and
kth column of the matrix Pi. The new probabilities ˆpjk are
generated using Equation (25), where s is a positive parameter
that controls the degrees of smoothing. A smaller s results in
a stronger temporal correlation.
ˆpjk =
pjk + s∑n
u=1 (pju + s)
(25)
We note that, the degrees of correlation with s are only
comparable with each other under the same n (i.e., |loc|).
A. Runtime of Privacy Quantification Algorithms
In this section, we compare the runtime of our algorithm
with Gurobi5 and lp_solve6, which are two well-known
5http://www.gurobi.com/. Commercial software. We use version 6.5.
6http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/. Open source software. We use version 5.5.
Tim
e 
(m
s)
   
in 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
1E+00
1E+03
1E+06
1E+09
50 100 150 200 250
lp_solve Gurobi. Algorithm 1
(a) α=10
n (domain size of transition matrix) α (the previous BPL or the next FPL)
1E+00
1E+02
1E+04
1E+06
α=0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 20
lp_solve Gurobi Algorithm 1
(b) n=50
47 m
38 h
11 s
Fig. 5: Runtime of Privacy Quantification Algorithms.
softwares for solving optimization problems, e.g., the linear-
fractional programming problem (18)∼(20) in our setting. We
run our privacy quantification algorithm 30 times, and run
Gurobi and lp_solve 5 times (because they are very time-
consuming), and then calculate the average runtime for each
of them. At each time, we randomly generate a transition
matrix Pi whose elements are uniformly drawn from [0, 1].
We verified that the optimal solution returned by the three
algorithms are the same. In the following, we describe two
factors that may affect the runtime: α as BPL at the previous
time point or FPL at the next time point (i.e., one input of
Algorithm 1), n as the domain size of transition matrix. The
results are shown in Figure 5.
Runtime vs. n. In Figure 5(a), we show the runtime of
the three algorithms with inputs of α = 10 and a n × n
random probability matrix Pi. The runtime of all algorithms
increase along with n because n is the number of variables
in our linear-fractional program. Algorithm 1 significantly
outperforms Gurobi and lp_solve. For example, in Figure
5(a), when n = 150, Algorithm 1 only spends 11 seconds,
whereas the runtime of Gurobi and lp_solve are about 47
minutes and 38 hours, respectively. Since Gurobi and lp_solve
spend tremendous time when n > 150, we omit them in the
graph.
Runtime vs. α. In Figure 5(b), we show that, a larger
previous BPL (or the next FPL), i.e., α, may lead to higher
runtime of Algorithm 1, whereas Gurobi and lp_solve are
stable for varying α. The reason is that, when α is large,
Algorithm 1 may take more time in Lines 9 and 10 for updating
each pair of qj ∈ q+ and dj ∈ d+ to satisfy Inequality (21).
An update in Line 10 is more likely to occur due to a large α
because q(e
α−1)+1
d(eα−1)+1 is increasing with α. However, such growth
of runtime along with α will not last so long because the
update happens n − 1 times in the worse case (according to
our previous analysis, the update will be terminated if only
one element is left in q+). As shown in Figure 5(b), when
α > 10, the runtime of Algorithm 1 becomes stable. We only
obtain a part of the runtime for lp_solve because a precision
problem occurs when α ≥ 10 due to the design of lp_solve.
B. Impact of Temporal Correlations on Privacy Leakage
In this section, for the convenience of explanation, we only
present the impact of temporal correlations on BPL because
the growth of BPL and FPL are in the same way but in the
reversed directions on the timeline. We examined s values in
Equation (25) ranging from 0.005 to 1. We set n to 50 and
200. Let ε be the privacy budget of Mt at each time point.
We test ε = 1 and 0.1. The results are shown in Figure 6 and
are summarized as follows.
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Privacy Leakage vs. s. Figure 6 shows that the privacy
leakage caused by a non-trivial temporal correlation will
increase over time, and such growth first increases sharply
and then remains stable because the increment is calculated
recursively. The increase caused by a stronger temporal corre-
lations (i.e., smaller s) is steeper, and the time for the increase
is longer. Consequently, stronger correlations result in higher
privacy leakage.
Privacy Leakage vs. ε. Comparing Figures 6(a) and (b),
we found that 0.1-DP significantly delayed the growth of
privacy leakage. Taking s = 0.005, for example, the noticeable
increase continues for almost 8 timestamps when ε = 1
(Figures 6(a)), whereas it continues for approximately 80
timestamps when ε = 0.1 (Figures 6(b)). However, after a
sufficient long time, the privacy leakage in the case of ε = 0.1
is not substantially lower than that of ε = 1 under stronger
temporal correlations. This is because, although the privacy
leakage is eliminated at each time point by setting a small
privacy budget, the adversaries can eventually learn sufficient
information from the continuous releases.
Privacy Leakage vs. n. Under the same s, TPL is smaller
when n (dimension of the transition matrix) is larger, as shown
in the lines s = 0.005 with n = 50 and n = 200 of Figure
6. This is because the transition matrices tend to be uniform
(weaker correlations) when the dimension is larger.
In conclusion, the experiments reveal that our quantifica-
tion algorithms can flexibly respond to different degrees of
temporal correlations.
C. Evaluation of Data Releasing Algorithms
In this section, we first show a visualization of privacy
allocation of Algorithms 2 and 3, then we compare the data
utility in terms of Laplace noise.
Figure 7 shows an example of budget allocation, w.r.t. PBi =(
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
) and PFi = ( 0.8 0.20.1 0.9 ). The goal is 1-DPT . It is easy to
see that Algorithm 3 has better data utility because it exactly
achieves the desired privacy level.
Figure 8 shows the data utility of Algorithms 2 and 3
with 2-DPT . We calculate the absolute value of the Laplace
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Fig. 8: Data utility of 2-DPT mechanisms.
noise with the allocated budgets (as shown in Figure 7).
Higher value of noise indicates lower data utility. In Figure
8(a), we test the data utility under backward and forward
temporal correlation both with parameter s = 0.001, which
means relatively strong correlation. It shows that, when T is
short, Algorithm 3 outperforms Algorithm 2. In other words,
regardless of how long T is, Algorithm 2 perturbs data in
the same way. In Figure 8(b), we investigate the data utility
under different degree of correlations. The dash line indicates
the absolute value of Laplace noise if no temporal correlation
exists (privacy budget is 2). It is easy to see that the data utility
significantly decays under strong correlation s = 0.01.
VII. RELATED WORK
Several studies have questioned whether differential pri-
vacy is valid for correlated data. Kifer and Machanavajjhala
[23] [24] [25] first raised the important issue that differential
privacy may not guarantee privacy if adversaries know the data
correlations. In their line of work, they [23] argued that it is
not possible to ensure any utility in addition to privacy without
making assumptions about the data-generating distribution
and the background knowledge available to an adversary. To
this end, they proposed a general and customizable privacy
framework called PufferFish, in which the potential secrets,
discriminative pairs, and data generation need to be explicitly
defined. Yang et al. [37] further investigated differential pri-
vacy on correlated tuples described using a proposed Gaussian
correlation model. The privacy leakage w.r.t. adversaries with
specified prior knowledge can be efficiently computed.
Zhu et al. [38] proposed correlated differential privacy
by redefining the sensitivity of queries on correlated data;
however, the privacy guarantee provided by this definition
for spatio-temporal data is unclear. Very recently, Liu et al.
[29] proposed dependent differential privacy by introducing
dependence coefficients for analyzing the sensitivity of differ-
ent queries under probabilistic dependences between tuples.
However, such dependence coefficients do not easily account
for the spatio-temporal correlations.
Dwork et al. first studied differential privacy under con-
tinual observation and proposed event-level/user-level privacy
[13] [15]. The previous studies in this setting focused on the
problems of high dimension [1] [27] [36], infinite sequence [6]
[7] [22], sliding window queries [5], and real-time publishing
[17]. [28]. None of them addressed the problem of temporally
correlated data.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has reported the
risk of differential privacy under temporal correlations for the
continuous aggregate release setting. Although a few studies
[32] [35] have considered a similar adversarial model in which
the adversaries have prior knowledge of temporal correlations
represented by Markov chains, they focused on location pri-
vacy in the single-user setting. Shokri et al. [32] proposed an
evaluation framework for location privacy protection, assuming
that the adversary knows the transition probabilities of each
user. Xiao et al. [35] proposed a mechanism extending DP
for single user location sharing under temporal correlations
modeled by Markov chains. In contrast, the scenario in this
paper focuses on quantifying the privacy loss of traditional
DP mechanisms under temporal correlations for continuous
aggregate release setting.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we quantified the risk of differential privacy
under temporal correlations by formalizing, analyzing and
calculating the privacy loss against adversaries who have
varying degrees of temporal correlations. This work opens up
interesting future research directions, such as modeling tempo-
ral correlations with other type of correlations (e.g. tuple-wise
correlations), and combining our methods with the previous
studies that neglected the effect of temporal correlations in
order to bound the temporal privacy leakage.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We need Dinkelbach’s Theorem and Lemma 3 in our proof.
Theorem 6 (Dinkelbach’s Theorem [11]). In a linear-
fractional programming problem, suppose that the variable
vector is x and the objective function is represented as Q(x)
D(x)
.
Vector x∗ is an optimal solution if and only if
max{Q(x)− λ ∗D(x)} = 0 where λ = Q(x
∗)
D(x∗)
. (26)
Lemma 3. For the following maximization problem
(k1, ..., kn ∈ R) with the same constraints as the ones in
the linear-fractional programming (18)∼(20),
maximize k1x1 + · · ·+ knxn
subject to e−α
B
t−1 ∗ xk ≤ xj ≤ eα
B
t−1 ∗ xk,
0 < xj < 1 and 0 < xk < 1,
where xj , xk ∈ x, j, k ∈ [1, n].
an optimal solution is as follows: if ki > 0, let xi = eα
B
t−1m
where m is a positive real number; if ki ≤ 0, let xi = m.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we suppose that the
smallest value in the optimal solution is xn. Let yj be
xj
xn
for j ∈ [1, n − 1]; then, 1 ≤ yj ≤ eα
B
t−1 . Replacing xj with yj
and setting xn = m, we have a new objective function 1m ∗
(k1y1 + · · ·+kn−1yn−1 +kn) whose solution is equivalent to the
original one. Because the only constraint is 1 ≤ yj ≤ eα
B
t−1 , the
following is an optimal solution for the maximum objective
function: if kj > 0, let yj = eα
B
t−1 ; if kj ≤ 0, let yj = 1.
Proof of Theorem 4: We first prove that, under the
conditions shown in Theorem 4, i.e., Inequalities (21) and (22),
an optimal solution of the problem (18)∼(20) is:
x
∗
=
{
xj = e
αBt−1 ∗m xj ∈ x+
xk = m xk ∈ x−
, (27)
where m is a positive real number.
For convenience, we rewrite our objective function as Q(x)
D(x)
in which Q(x) = qx and D(x) = dx. Substituting x∗ of Equation
(27) into Q(x) and D(x), we have Q(x∗) = q(eα
B
t−1 − 1) + 1 and
D(x∗) = d(eα
B
t−1 − 1) + 1 (recall that q = ∑ q+ and d = ∑d+).
Then, we can rewrite Inequalities (21) and (22) in Theorem 4
as follows.
qj
dj
>
Q(x∗)
D(x∗)
, ∀j ∈ [1, n] where qj ∈ q+, dj ∈ d+ (28)
qk
dk
≤ Q(x
∗)
D(x∗)
, ∀k ∈ [1, n] where qk ∈ q−, dk ∈ d− (29)
According to Dinkelbach’s Theorem, to prove x∗ in (27)
is an optimal solution, we only need to prove the following
equation because of D(x∗) > 0.
maximize {D(x∗)Q(x)−Q(x∗)D(x)} = 0. (30)
We expand the above equation as follows.
Eqn.(30) = D(x∗)(q+x+ + q−x−)−Q(x∗)(d+x+ + d−x−)
=
(
D(x
∗
)q
+ −Q(x∗)d+)x+ + (D(x∗)q− −Q(x∗)d−)x− (31)
By Equations (28) and (29)), we have D(x∗)q+−Q(x∗)d+ >
0 and D(x∗)q− −Q(x∗)d− ≤ 0. Hence, according to Lemma 3,
we can obtain the maximum value in Equation (30) by setting
x+ = [eα
B
t−1 ∗ m] and x− = [m] where m is a positive real
number. Now, we obtain the maximum value in Equation (30).(
(D(x∗)q −Q(x∗)d)eεm+ (D(x∗)(1− q)−Q(x∗)(1− d)))m
=
(
D(x∗)(qeε + (1− q))−Q(x∗)(deε + (1− d)))m
=
(
D(x∗)Q(x∗)−Q(x∗)D(x∗))m = 0
Therefore, by Dinkelbach’s Theorem, x∗ is an optimal solution
for the problem (18)∼(20). Substituting them into the objective
function (18), we obtain the maximum value q(e
αBt−1−1)+1
d(e
αB
t−1−1)+1
.
